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AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF PRESIDENT-ELECT TRUMP’S
CARRIER DEAL: THE BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
EXPOSURE CAUSED BY DIRECTING A SUBSIDIARY TO
UNDERTAKE A TRANSACTION FOR THE PARENT
COMPANY’S BENEFIT
Oderah C. Nwaeze ∗
INTRODUCTION
In February 2016, Carrier Corporation (“Carrier”) announced to its Indiana
workers it intended to move some of its manufacturing capabilities to Mexico,
which would displace approximately 1,400 American jobs. Then-Republican
nominee for President of the United States, Donald J. Trump, caught wind of
Carrier’s plans and began to dedicate a substantial portion of his campaign
message to the promise that he would prevent American companies from
sending jobs overseas. True to his platform, in late November, President-Elect
Trump announced that he had struck a deal with Carrier to keep close to 1,000
jobs in Indiana.
By deciding not to move approximately 850 jobs to Mexico, Carrier will be
forfeiting nearly $65 million a year in savings. In exchange, the state of
Indiana plans to reward Carrier with merely $7 million in tax incentives over
ten years, as long as Carrier invests $16 million in its Indiana facilities. Based
on these terms alone, one may question why Carrier would agree to this deal.
The tipping point, however, was not what Carrier stands to gain, but the
specter of what the new administration could take from Carrier’s parent
company, United Technologies Corporation (“United Technologies”).
United Technologies provides high technology products and services to
international customers in several industries, including defense. Notably, the
Pentagon is one of United Technologies’ largest customers. In 2015, 10
percent of United Technologies’ $56 billion in revenue came from the federal
∗
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government. Given that President-Elect Trump has repeatedly warned of
“consequences” for companies that move jobs away from the United States,
once he set his sights on Carrier, there was concern that United Technologies
could lose over $5 billion in government contracts. Thus, in the interest of its
financial wellbeing, United Technologies appears to have caused Carrier to
forgo yearly savings of $65 million.
On a surface level, the Carrier deal raises serious questions regarding
whether Carrier’s board members breached their fiduciary duties by placing
the interests of United Technologies ahead of the interests of Carrier. Absent
the essential details of the deal, including the process employed, it would be
improper to speculate on the appropriateness of the actions of Carrier’s board.
What’s more, Carrier is a wholly-owned subsidiary of United Technologies,
and under Delaware law1, it is well-established that a wholly-owned subsidiary
may be managed entirely for the best interests of the parent company and its
shareholders. 2
Nevertheless, there are legitimate corporate governance concerns raised by
a situation where a parent company exerts its control over a partially-owned
subsidiary to force a transaction that serves the best interests of the parent
company over the interests of the subsidiary’s stockholders. In such a
circumstance, Delaware law appears to support the viability of breach of
fiduciary duty claims against the parent company. 3
I. CORPORATE ACTIONS ARE TYPICALLY GIVEN THE PRESUMPTION OF
LOYALTY AND DUE CARE
The business of the typical American corporation is managed at the
direction of the company’s board of directors. In a nutshell, the board’s role is
to supervise the corporation’s affairs. This includes formulating corporate
strategy, recommending or approving major corporate transactions,

1 Looking to Delaware law is appropriate given that both Carrier and United Technologies were
incorporated under the laws of that state. In addition, Delaware has a central role in corporate governance
matters. More than 1,000,000 business entities have made Delaware their legal home, including over 50% of
all publicly-traded companies in the United States and 64% of the Fortune 500. This is largely because of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), a dynamic statute that was drafted to ensure that stockholders,
directors, and officers have maximum flexibility when running their businesses, and the Delaware Court of
Chancery—the preeminent venue for corporate law disputes.
2 See Anadarko Petro. Corp. v. Panhandle Eastern Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988).
3 See supra note 2.
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disseminating information about the company’s finances, setting salaries and
compensation for directors and officers, and distributing corporate assets.
In discharging their obligations, directors owe fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty to each company they serve. The duty of care mandates that directors
make decisions in an informed manner while the duty of loyalty requires that
the board acts only in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.
Delaware courts generally afford wide latitude to a board that is independent,
disinterested, informed, and motivated simply to obtain the best transaction
reasonably available for shareholders. Indeed, the business judgment rule
prohibits the Delaware Court of Chancery from interfering with decisions of
independent and disinterested directors who are acting in good faith and
engaging in an informed decision-making process. That is because the business
judgment rule presumes that “in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief
that the action take was in the best interests of the company.” 4
II. A PARENT COMPANY WILL OWE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO ITS PARTIALLYOWNED SUBSIDIARY
Because of the intertwined relationship between parent companies and their
subsidiaries, and the control that a parent may exert over its subsidiary, parents
of partially-owned subsidiaries share the same fiduciary duties as the
subsidiary’s board.
In the parent-subsidiary relationship, the parent typically controls the
subsidiary through majority or complete stock ownership. Owning a majority
of the subsidiary’s stock will allow the parent to select or influence the
selection of the members of the subsidiary’s board of directors. In many cases,
this results in the subsidiary’s board consisting primarily of individuals who
are also officers, directors, and/or employees of the parent. And, in turn, many
of the subsidiary’s senior officers often will be officers or other employees of
the parent as well. The parent company’s influence over the partially-owned
subsidiary’s board and senior management allows the parent to monitor or to
even control the subsidiary’s operations. That influence, coupled with
ownership of a substantial portion of the subsidiary’s shares, classifies the
parent company as a “controlling stockholder.” In that capacity, the parent
company owes fiduciary duties to the subsidiary and its minority stockholders.
4

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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The rationale is that by exercising control over the corporation’s directors and
officers, who make decisions for the corporation in a fiduciary capacity, the
parent assumes the duties of a fiduciary.
III. ALLEGATIONS OF SELF-INTEREST COULD FORM THE BASIS OF BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY CLAIMS AGAINST A PARENT COMPANY
In circumstances where a subsidiary’s board approves a corporate action
that jeopardizes stockholder value simply because the undertaking was
favored, recommended, or proposed by its parent company, the presumption of
loyalty and due care is not afforded. 5 Rather, the burden is on the parent
company to prove that the transaction was entirely fair. 6 Under similar facts,
the Delaware Court of Chancery has affirmed the existence of valid breach of
fiduciary duty claims against the parent company.
Wallace v. Wood 7 is instructive on this point. In that case, the plaintiffslimited partners asserted derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty against
the defendants-parent corporations, alleging they caused the general partner to
engage in leveraged acquisitions that were financed by affiliates in order to
generate fees for the defendants. The parents’ control stemmed from the fact
that the general partner was the subsidiary of one of the defendants, which was
a subsidiary of another defendant/parent corporation. 8 The defendants-parent
corporations moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that they did
not owe or breach any fiduciary duties to the limited partners. The Court of
Chancery denied the defendants’ motion, holding that the allegations that the
defendants-parent corporations wielded and used their control over the
partnership to cause it to enter into transactions that benefit the defendants at
the expense of the partnership were sufficient to state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty. 9
CONCLUSION
Although President-Elect Trump’s Carrier deal can be summarized as
Carrier appearing to forgo tens of millions of dollars in yearly savings for the
financial benefit of its parent company, given that Carrier is a wholly-owned
5
6
7
8
9

Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21 (Del. Ch. 2002).
Id.
752 A.2d 1175 (Del. Ch. 1999).
Wallace, 752 A.2d at 1178.
Id. at 1178, 1180–81.
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subsidiary, United Technologies faces no exposure based on fiduciary duty
claims. Parent companies that exert similar control over their partially-owned
subsidiary, however, will not be similarly shielded. Instead, Delaware law
appears to support breach of fiduciary duty claims against a parent company
that directs its partially-owned subsidiary to enter into a transaction for the
parent company’s benefit.

